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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

*

Plaintiff/Appellee,

*

vs.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

*
Case No. 981469-CA

WILHELIMINA LOTTE,
*

Priority 2

Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a final judgment of conviction
in the Second Judicial District Court of Davis County,
Utah, before the Honorable Jon M. Memmott, enterd on the
2nd day of June, 1998.
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal
by virtue of Rule 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated 78-2a-2 (2) (f) (1953 as amended).

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

May an officer insert his head inside a vehicle he has

stopped for a traffic stop without probable cause or reasonable
suspicion?
2.

Even if an officer may intrude his body into a vehicle

subsequent to a traffic stop but prior to the establishment
of probable cause or reasonable suspicion, may a burnt tablespoon
form the evidence sufficient to permit the officer to further
detain and request the driver to allow further search of vehicle?
3. Should an officer be compelled to obtain a search warrant if
he observes what may be drug paraphenelia in an automobile stopped
for a traffic violation?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The standard of review for suppression issues is
that findings of fact will not be disturbed unless clearly
erroneous.

State v. Steward. 806 P.2d 215 (Utah App 1991).

The standard of review for conclusions of law is
a correction of error standard.

State v_. Steward. supra.

TABLE OF CASES and STATUTES, ORDINANCES and CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS WHICH ARE DETERMINATIVE
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1.

State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229 (Ut. Ct App)

2.

State v_. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9 (Ut. Ct App 1993)

3.

State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274 (Ut. Ct App 1994)

4.

State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 272 (Utah 1984)

5

State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990)

-

6.

State v. Patefield, 927 P.2d 655 (Ut. Ct App 1996)

7.

State v. Schlosser, 774 P.Id 1132 (Utah 1989)

8.

State v^ Sims, 808 P.2d 141 (Utah 1991)

9.

State v. Strickling, 884 P.2d 979 (Utah App 1992)

10.

U.S. v_. Angular-Fernandez, 1995 WL 257255 (10th Cir)

11.

U.S. y\

12.

U.S. v. Walker, No. 90-CR-13 (Utah 1990)

13.

United Sates Constitution, Fourth Amendment states:

Nielsen, 9 F.3d 1487

(10th Cir 1993)

The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.

11.

Article I, section 14 of the Constitution of the

State of Utah states:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not
be violated and no warrant shall issue but
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upon probable cause supported by oath or
affirm action, particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the person or thing to be
seized.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On February 27, 1997, the defendants automoble was stopped
for speeding in Davis County with a visual estimate of speed by
the Utah Highway Patrol. (TR.4)

The officer approached the de-

fendant while she was seated as driver in the vehicle and asked for
defendant's registration and as the defendant reached for that the
officer stuck his head into the vehicle and looked in. (Tr 5 at
lines 18 to 21 and Tr. 14 lines 11 to 16, and Tr 15 at lines 2 to
6).
The officer saw a burned spoon in the drivers side door
compartment and based upon that he asked to search the automobile
of the defendant (Tr. 15 lines 19 to 20). He obtained her verbal
consent, conducted a search and found in the purse of defendant
he found white powder residue that turned out to be controlled
substance (Tr 7 lines 17 to 23 and Tr 8 lines 1 to 3).
STATEMENT OF CASE
The defendant was charged in the possession of methaphetmine
a third degree felony and possession of paraphenlia on February 27,
1997, in Davis County, State of Utah.
4

The defendant moved to suppress the evidence found during a
search of her car and an evidentiary hearing was held on April 15,
1998, before the Honorable Jon Memmott in Farmington, Utah.

The

Motion to Suppress was denied on the 15th day of April, 1998. On
June 2, 1998, the defendant entered a conditional plea to
possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony and the
defendant appealled to this Court on June 23, 1998.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1. MAY AN OFFICER INSERT HIS HEAD INSIDE A VEHICLE HE HAS
STOPPED FOR A TRAFFIC STOP WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE OR REASONABLE
SUSPICION?
The defendant maintains that in a traffic stop the arresting
officer may not insert his head into the stopped vehicle without
reasonable suspicion or other valid reason and that such an insertion is a search.
2. EVEN IF AN OFFICER MAY INTRUDE HIS BODY INTO A VEHICLE
SUBSEQUENT TO A TRAFFIC STOP BUT PRIOR TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
PROBABLE CAUSE OR REASONABLE SUSPICION, MAY A BURNT TABLESPOON
FORM THE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO PERMIT THE OFFICER TO FURTHER
DETAIN AND REQUEST THE DRIVER TO ALLOW FURTHER SEARCH OF VEHICLE?
The defendant maintains that the sight of a burned spoon does
not rise to the level or reasonable suspicion that a felony has
been committed.
3. SHOULD AN OFFICER BE COMPELLED TO OBTAIN A SEARCH WARRANT
IF HE OBSERVES WHAT MAY BE DRUG PARAPHENELIA IN AN AUTOMOBILE
STOPPED FOR A TRAFFIC VIOLATION?
5

That there is no finding from the record and nothing in the
record to find exigent circumstances to allow a search
and seizure without a warrant nor is there anything to suggest that
a warrant could not be obtained.

ARGUMENT
1. MAY AN OFFICER INSERT HIS HEAD INSIDE A VEHICLE HE HAS
STOPPED FOR A TRAFFIC STOP WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE OR REASONABLE
SUSPICION?
In the case at bar the police officer, shortly after the stop
of the defendant's automobile, "stuck" his head inside the automobile of the defendant's automobile and looked inside. (Tr 15 lines
2 to 6).

He did this without consent or justification.

He saw a

burnt spoon by looking down to the door compartment (Tr 15 line 4)
and then asked to search the vehicle which was granted by the defendant. The officer testified he asked for consent because of the
spoon he saw (Tr 15 line 19 to 20).
The defendant contends that there is no testimony in the
record which would indicate that a burned spoon is in any manner
indicative of any unlawful activity or even that the officer concluded that a burnt spoon is indicative of crime activity. Thusly,
there are no articulable acts to connect the defendant with the
possession of drugs.

State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274, (Utah Ct App
6

1994), and State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 216 (Utah App 1991).
The argument is that the State must establish some testimony
that a burnt spoon means something and that something rises to
articulable suspicion.

No such testimony is extant at all.

However, even if there were testimony linking the burnt spoon
to criminal activity and thusly serve as articulable suspicion,
there was no right for the officer to have inserted his head into
the interior of the defendant's automobile.
There was no objection probable cause to allow the officer to
invade the automobiles interior and look around. There needs to be
a common sense assessment the circumstances.
P.2d 284, 285 (Utah App 1990).

State v. Brown, 798

There were no facts at all for the

officer's intrusion and thusly the search must fail even if this
became a level two stop pursuant to State v. Smoot, 921 P.2d 1003
(Ut. App 1996) because such a search requires some reasonable
suspicion even if there is a temporary detention in order to write
a speeding ticket.
2. EVEN IF AN OFFICER MAY INTRUDE HIS BODY INTO A VEHICLE
SUBSEQUENT TO A TRAFFIC STOP BUT PRIOR TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
PROBABLE CAUSE OR REASONABLE SUSPICION MAY A BURNT TABLESPOON
FORM THE EVIDENCE SUFFICENT TO PERMIT THE OFFICER TO FURTHER
DETAIN AND REQUEST THE DRIVER TO ALLOW FURTHER SEARCH OF THE
VEHICLE?
The defendant argues that if there is no evidence at all of
the signficance of a burnt spoon, then the State may never be

7

said to have met the burden of showing articulable suspicion or
probable cause.
State v. Steward, 806 P.d 213, 216, (Ut. App 1991) is to the
effect that mere driving in proximity to drug searches in nearby
houses is not enough facts to show a suspicion of criminal
activity.
In State v_. Patefield. 927 P. 2d 655 (Ct. App 1996) the court
failed to find probable cause in a level two situation where the
officer observed a 12-pack of beer because the possession of beer
is lawful.
These cases are valid precedent for the idea that even if the
Court has properly before it the spoon in question because the
officer's insertion of his head is ruled valid, there must be
some connection of that to criminal activity.

Nothing exists in

the record or by common sense and the request to search the vehicle
based upon such a spoon is not permissable because there is no
articulable suspicion of anything.
3. SHOULD AN OFFICER BE COMPELLED TO OBTAIN A SEARCH WARRANT
IF HE OBSERVES WHAT MAY BE DRUG PARAPHENELIA IN AN AUTOMOBILE
STOPPED FOR A TRAFFIC VIOLATION?
Assuming arguendo that the officer in the case at bar had the
right to intrude his head into the vehicle of the defendant while
he was asking her for her registration and assuming that a spoon
which has a burn spot on it is indicative of drug paraphenlia
8

giving the officer reasonable suspicion to further detain the defendant, should the officer have obtained a warrant?
Nothing in the record indicates that there was any problem in
obtaining a warrant.

The level-two stop had escalated into some-

thing more because the officer had seen what he thought was
something that gave him reasonable suspicion to continue or
escalate the seizures as in State v. Higgins, 884 P.2d 1242, 1244
(Utah 1994) and fftate v. Patefield, 927 P.2d 655 (Ut App 1996).
The officer unlawfully extended the traffic stop to conduct
a search contrary to State v. Figuero - Solorio 830 P.2d 276, 280
(Utah App 1992) and State _v. Robison, 797 P.2d 431 (Ut. App 1990)
but also, the issue would have been resolved had he obtained a
warrant.
State y_. Larrocco, 794 P.2d 460:
As Justice Zimmerman explained in Hygh, supra:
Once the threat that the suspect will
injure the officers with concealed weapons
or will destroy evidence is gone, there is
no persuasive reason why the officers
cannot take the time to secure a warrant.
Such a requirement would present little
impediment to police investigations,
especially in light of the ease in
which warrants can be obtained under Utah's
telephonic warrant statute, U.C.A., 1953,
7-23-4(2) (1982 ed.)
gtate v. Hygh, 711 P.2d at 272; see State v. Lopez,
676 P.2d 393 (Utah 1984).
9

CONCLUSION
The defendant/appellant argues that the officer did not have
the right to intrude his body into her vehicle and look around
while the encounter was still a level-two stop to give a speeding
ticket, and even if he had such a right nothing in the record or by
common sense indicates that the spoon is indicative of any unlawful
activity or was unlawful in itself and even if it were reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity, nothing in the record indicates
that the officer could not have obtained a warrant and for those
reasons the trial court erred and the Motion to Suppress should
have been granted.

. let

DATED thrs / -> day of February, 1999

Respectfully submitted,

J o h n / R / Bttcher
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

DELIVERY CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
was delivered to the following on the YVx day of February, 1999.
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Catherine M. Johnson
Assistant Atto^dey\ General
160 East 300 Soutl
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ohn R. Bucher
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